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Comments and Casenotes
ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
By PAUL R. KACH*
An ever present theme of controversy and debate, general in all the States, and current in Maryland in one form
or another each time its Legislature assembles, is the extent,
if any, to which the rules of evidence should be altered, or,
according to the proponents, "modernized". Especially is
this true as to the several Boards and Commissions to which,
less perhaps than in most States, though some yet feel too
generously, judicial or quasi-judicial powers have been recently assigned.
Much support for the movement is found among the most
respectable and disinterested of authorities. Thus, in the
preface to the first edition of his monumental study of the
law of evidence, Professor Wigmore is found declaring:
"IThe rules of evidence, over and above all others, have come
to bear, even within the profession itself, the stigma of
technical arbitrariness and obstructive unreason."'1 So
staid and conservative a publication as the Encyclopedia
Britannica (one reflecting, too, lay, rather than professional
opinion) comments that in America "there is general distrust of the rules of judicial proof ".2 It concludes its discussion with the critical assertion: "The lay public is not
sufficiently informed about defects and debatable points to
express more than blanket condemnation'2 To this Professor (now Mr. Justice) Frankfurter substantially joins
with the statement that: "New conflicts and new types of
controversies cannot be adjusted by the limited, litigious
procedure, well enough adapted for (the) ancient common
law action".'
It is of course, recognized as axiomatic that: "Historically, the distinction is fundamental, i. e., the common law
rules of Evidence grew up exclusively in jury trial, and do
not apply 'ex stricti jure' in any tribunal but a jury
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. LL.B., 1920, University of Maryland
School of Law.
I This, from the preface to the First Edition, published in 1904, may also
be found in the Second Edition (1922) xiii.
88 Encyclopedia Britannica (14th Ed.) 914.
'ibid.
Frankfurter, Introduction to Symposiu,n on Administrattve Law (1933)
18 Iowa L. Rev. 129, 130.
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court.'' 5 This has been the rule of practice of the common
law itself from early times. In proof, Professor Thayer,
quoting from a treatise by Sir Henry Maine, observes:
"And after pointing out that the law of evidence grew out
of the jury system, he (Sir Henry Maine) adds truly that
'the English rules of evidence are never very scrupulously
attended to by tribunals which, like the Court of Chancery,
adjudicate both on law and on fact, through the same organs
and the same procedure' ".
More cautionary views upon the subject are not, however, lacking. It is Mr. Wigmore's final conclusion as to
our Boards and Commissions: "On the whole, then, the
popular view, viz. that the jury-trial system of Evidence can
be generally dispensed with in administrative tribunals must
be deemed to be unverified and premature." 7 In that opinion, he is fully sustained in the more recent expression by
Professor Chafee of the Harvard Law School, who holds
that more evidence is needed "before we decide that the experiment (of partially setting aside the common law rules
of evidence) is a failure in these tribunals and should be
abandoned, or that a similar policy . . . should . . . be
adopted in the ordinary courts ". Mr. P. T. Sherman, after
a study of the results before the New York Workmen's Compensation Commission of a "liberal" rule of evidence in
practical operation, maintained that in its operation the
abuses over-balanced the recorded gains.'
Maryland's best known departure from the rules of evidence is embodied in the Code section 0 providing that the
State Industrial Accident Commission "shall not be bound
by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence or
by any technical or formal rules of procedure, other than
as herein provided, but may make the investigation in such
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly
the spirit of this article". But unlimited experiment under
that statute has been prevented by the Court of Appeals,
which, it is conceived, wisely decided: ". . . the courts
(should) adapt themselves somewhat to the increased latitude allowed to the commission, (but) this adaptation must
at the same time, and as far as it can consistently be done,
r 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd Ed. 1922) See. 4B.
6 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898)
508.
''Wigmore, Zoo. cit. supra n. 5.
'Chafee, The Progress of the Law (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 306.
Sherman, Evidence and Proof Under Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1920) 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 203.
10 Md. Code, Art. 101, Sec. 10.
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avoid abandonment of cautions and safeguards which seem
necessary, not only for constitutional due process of law,
buit also for the assurance of reliability in the basis of adjudication".
The matter of the procedure before administrative tribunals has been the recent subject of an authoritative survey in Great Britain, culminating in the report made to the
British Parliament in April, 1932 by the Lord Chancellor of
England, styled "The Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers". Mr. Arthur Suzman of London summarized that Report as follows:12 "It is pointed out that although Ministers and ministerial tribunals, when exercising
judicial and semi-judicial functions, are in no way bound to
conform to the identical procedure of a court of law, there
nevertheless are certain canons of judicial conduct which all
persons and tribunals exercising such functions ought to
observe". Those are stated to be: (1) that no man should
be a judge in his own cause, hence no Minister should decide
a controversy concerning his own conduct and power; (2)
that no party ought to be condemned unheard; and (3) that
the parties are entitled to know the reasons for the decision.
Add to them a fourth and fifth requirement left without
special specific emphasis in the Report that every case is
entitled to be fully heard and on reliable proof, and the
standards in the light of which it is herein urged the rules
of evidence of fact finding Boards should be both framed
and applied are succinctly stated.
The Constitutional minimum that all Boards must observe has been set by the Supreme Court of the United
States as follows: "The due process clause does not control the mere forms of procedure, provided only the fundamental requirements of notice and opportunity to defend are
afforded".18 That Court, however, has not hesitated to reverse an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission for
which it found no legally sufficient evidence."4
Some departure from common law rules of evidence has
been had in Maryland, with most beneficial results. Our
statutes for the admission of accounts, for the taking of the
testimony of non-resident witnesses upon five days' notice,
and requiring the Court to advise the jury as to the statute
law of other States are examples that readily come to mind.
11 Standard oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 Atl. 850 (1925).

12Suzman, Administrative Law in England (1930) 18 Iowa L. Rev. 160,
176-7.
IsZayas v. Lothrop, Luce and Co., 231 U. S. 171, 58 L. Ed. 172, 34 S. Ct.
108 (1913).
1,U. S. v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 68 L. Ed.1016, 44 S. Ct.
565 (1924).
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No one could seriously claim that there is no room for further changes. But opposition is here sought to be voiced
to the notion, too generally entertained, that drastic revision
is in order and our whole system outmoded. Further opposition is registered to the theory that, before administrative
tribunals, all the rules of evidence should give way to the
Commission's conception of what will best promote justice
in each given case.
The rules of evidence are largely of judicial origin."
That which is the handicraft of British and American
Judges is usually found to have much to warrant its retention. This is true of the law of evidence. Modifications, following careful study and open debate, are from time to time
in order, but not scrapping and discarding, nor unbridled
discretion.
Once, heretofore, there was a movement in our law designed to correct all the alleged abuses of what was then
unquestionably a too rigid system of procedure and a vastly
cramped field of substantive law by ignoring, where it was
thought necessary, that which had gone before. From that
movement, our equity jurisprudence arose. In the successive British Chancellors it was nurtured by a sturdy
stock. Yet, it was found, and is now the law, as has been
well summarized by Lord Eldon :16 "The doctrines of this
(the Chancery) Court ought to be as well settled, and made
as uniform almost as those of the common law, laying down
fixed principles, but taking care that they are applied according to the circumstances of each case. I cannot agree
that the doctrines of this court are to be changed with every
succeeding judge. Nothing would inflict on me greater
pain, in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had
done anything to justify the reproach that the equity of the
court varies like the Chancellor'sfoot."'
There is still a place in our law to side with the great
Chief Justice Marshall who declared: "All questions upon
the rules of evidence are of vast importance to all orders
and degrees of man; our lives, our liberty, and our property
"The English law of evidence as at present administered is of comparatively modern growth, having for the most part been built up by the
judges in the last two centuries, with special reference to trials by Jury,
and it consists of this judge-made law as modified by various statutory
enactments." Encyclopedia Britannica, (14th Ed.) V. 8, p. 905.
20 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Reprint 670 (1818).
1 The reference to the Chancellor's foot is, of course, to the witty complaint of Seldon: "Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, and know what we trust to. Equity Is according to the conscience
of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity.
'Tis all one as if they should make his foot the standard for the measure
we call a Chancellor's foot." 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Juris., 62, N.
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are all concerned in the support of these rules, which have
been matured by the wisdom of ages, and are now revered
from their antiquity and the good sense in which they are
founded". 8 Or, as Pollack and Maitland so aptly phrased it:
"Discretion is not of necessity 'the law of tyrants', . . . yet
. . formalism is the twin-born sister of Liberty'I% In that
spirit may the Maryland Bar ever be alert to maintain its
rules of evidence as the most valued service it can render to
keep the Free State truly "free "!
Of all such efforts, virtually complete approval is found
in the Report of "The Committee on Improvements in the
Law of Evidence" made to the Judicial 'Section of The
American Bar Association at its July, 1938 Convention in
Cleveland, wherein it is said :20
"All will agree that the body of the rules of evidence, in their skeleton framework, are wise and wholesome-in short, they are a valuable and unique contribution to the world's expedients in the investigation of
truth. What is lamented is their infinitesimal, meticulous, petty elaboration into a mass not capable of being
perfectly mastered and used by everyday judges and
practitioners."I
The report went on to point out,2 ' with disapproval, the
tendency toward the so-called "legislative Star-Chamber
alteration" of the rules of evidence. A recommendation
was made that legislatures should not change the rules of
evidence without giving due notice and opportunity of hearing to state and local bar associations. It asserted that
too many changes in the rules had been made at the behest
of interested members of the legislatures with personal
notions of what would be desirable amendments, or through
pressure brought to bear by individual attorneys who had
suffered the loss of cases because of specific rules, or because of the influence of pressure groups which had been
able to obtain changes beneficial to their interests.
'l Queen v. Hepburn. 7 Cranch 290, 295, 3 L. Ed. 348 (1813).
192 Pollack and Maitland, History of English Law (2nd Ed.) 563.
20Report of the Section of Judicial Administration. 68.
11Ibid, 72.

